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1. The understanding of moral values and principles is burdened by a long history, the different meanings they had in different historical periods, and the fact that most of them can be aptly characterized as 
“essentially contested concepts.” As if these were not enough, any attempt 
to make sense of dignity as a moral value and give a plausible account of it 
has to deal with the diametrically opposing judgments concerning its role 
and significance that abound in recent literature.1 On the one hand, there are 
1 Philosophical discussions start with the treatment of dignitas in Cicero’s On Duties. It should 
be noted that the study of past conceptions of dignity is not only of historical interest, since 
they often re-surface in one way or another in relevant contemporary debates. For historical 
studies see Panajotis Kondylis and Viktor Pöschl, “Würde,” in Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, 
Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland, eds. Otto Brunner, Werner 
Conze, and Reinhart Koselleck, 637-677 (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1992); Marcus Düvell, Jens 
Braarvig, Roger Brownsword, and Dietmar Mieth, eds., The Cambridge Handbook of Human 
Dignity: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Martha 
C. Nussbaum, The Cosmopolitan Tradition: A Noble but Flawed Ideal (Cambridge, MA: Belknap 
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those who outright dismiss it as a useless normative concept, either because 
of its inherent ambiguity and indeterminacy, or because of its redundancy. 
In their view, there are other values that could more appropriately highlight 
and accurately describe a cluster of moral transgressions that are mistakenly 
dubbed as violations of dignity.2 On the other hand, there are eminent 
philosophers, such as Jürgen Habermas, who confer dignity a highly elevated 
status and envisage it as a kind of supreme value, which 
performs the function of a seismograph that registers […] those 
rights that the citizens of a political community must grant 
themselves if they are to be able to respect one another as 
members of a voluntary association of free and equal persons.3 
In this essay I intend to explore the possibility of a middle-of-the-road, 
“deflationary” approach, which professes neither the abandonment of dignity 
nor the de-evaluation of a plurality of other crucial values for the sake of 
dignity. I am also interested in an approach that takes into account our pre-
theoretical relevant intuitions, conceives dignity as a distinct value – one 
among many – that does not trespass on the scope of other values, and 
endorses a justification of it that does not rely on the wholesale acceptance 
of a particular comprehensive moral theory. I realize that this is a book-length 
project, but I would like to present here some preliminary basic remarks, that 
could serve as a starting point for further reflection. 
2. On condition that we are seeking a conception of dignity that preserves its 
role as a distinct and clear value without overshadowing other equally basic 
values, we could start with the following description: Dignity can be conceived 
as the prima facie moral claim to minimally respect our own personality and 
the personality of anyone else without any restriction or exception. Given that 
Press, 2019), 64-96; see also Remy Debes, ed., Dignity: A History (Oxford: Oxford Universi-
ty Press, 2017). For a detailed discussion of dignity as an essentially contested concept see 
Philippe-André Rodriguez, “Human Dignity as an Essentially Contested Concept,” Cambridge 
Journal of International Affairs 28, no. 4 (2015): 743-756.
2 See, for instance, Kondylis, “Würde,” section VIII; Ruth Macklin, “Dignity is a Useless Con-
cept,” British Medical Journal 327, no. 7429 (2003): 1419-1420; Matti Häyry, “Another Look 
at Dignity,” Cambridge Quarterly of Health Care Ethics 13, no. 1 (2004): 7-14, and Andrea San-
giovanni, Humanity without Dignity: Moral Equality, Respect, and Human Rights (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2017), 13-71. The latter author takes great pains to show that 
the foundation of moral equality and basic rights does not depend upon the notion of dignity.
3 Jürgen Habermas, “The Concept of Human Dignity and the Realistic Utopia of Human Rights,” 
Metaphilosophy 41, no. 4 (2010): 469. Donelly and Griffin also belong to those who share the 
view that dignity grounds all basic human rights. See Jack Donelly, Human Rights in Theory and 
Practice (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2013), 29, 130-132; also James Griffin, 
On Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 200-201.
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this kind of treatment is due from anyone to everyone, dignity treats people 
as equals in this respect.
3. It has been argued that human dignity is subject to variations or degrees in 
the sense that people have more or less dignity depending on their character, 
their actions and omissions, and their way of life in general.4 There is some 
confusion in this contention. Dignity as a distinct moral value should be 
kept apart from the plausible view that the moral assessment of others is 
conditioned by responsible agency on their behalf. The minimal respect for 
the personality of third parties dignity commands should be invariable and 
independent of any achievement, excellence, vice or malfeasance. In this 
sense, Dr. Pap (the Greek doctor who saved women from cervical cancer) and 
the worst criminal are equals as far as their dignity is concerned. Of course, 
this may not prevent us from having much higher esteem for Dr. Pap and show 
it on every occasion. We should not conflate dignity with personal desert in 
the wide sense and the endlessly debated obligations and duties ensuing from 
it.5 
4. Failure to show the required respect for others’ personality constitutes a 
form of moral harm that it is distinguished from other moral harms related 
to onslaughts on people’s life, bodily integrity, well-being, freedom, and 
autonomy, or violations of various forms of distributive or non-distributive 
justice. I could degrade someone’s dignity without causing her any other form 
of moral harm. I could also morally harm a third person without affecting her 
dignity. Let me give two examples from personal experience.
A. When I was doing my military service, a non-commissioned 
officer ordered a small group of us to run around a courtyard 
half-naked and holding our rifles over our head under the 
excruciating Greek summer sun. This was not some kind of 
punishment for a petty offence we had committed, nor part of 
an officially approved training course. He just wanted to spite us 
for his own unfathomable reasons. Fortunately, as soon as we 
had started feeling the pain, a passing officer realized what was 
going on and ordered him to put an end to this absurd hazing. 
I cannot say that I suffered from this abuse of power any other 
moral harm apart from a personal humiliation. 
4 Suzy Killmister, Contours of Dignity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), 15.
5 See among many others Serena Olsaretti, ed., Desert and Justice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
2003). In this paragraph I rely on Darwall’s distinction between “appraisal respect” and “rec-
ognition respect.” Stephen Darwall, The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect and Ac-
countability (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 122-126.
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B. A reckless driver was driving backwards in a one-way street 
and fell upon my parked car causing serious damage to it. It goes 
without saying that my property rights were violated and that 
my wellbeing was slightly affected, but I cannot maintain that he 
did not display the minimal required respect to my personality.
However, it is common for assaults on dignity to be accompanied with all 
sorts of moral harms. One of the most appalling examples one can think of 
is the treatment of the inmates in Nazi concentration camps. It would not 
be far from the truth to say that these individuals suffered any moral harm 
imaginable including a total and constant degradation of their personality 
and humanity. 
5. How can dignity as described here be morally justified? A heuristic that was 
first used by the Stoics, and since then remains popular, consists in selecting 
one or more commonly held human features, which are supposed to make all 
humans bearers of a special value called dignity. In the Christian theological 
context, the dominant feature is man’s likeness to God’s image.6 In a secular 
context, it is common for this purpose to single out one or more natural and/
or cultural traits such as our ability to make crucial choices,7 rationality, our 
supposedly unparalleled communication and interaction skills, humanity’s 
brilliant record in the arts and the sciences,8 etc. However, this approach is 
not devoid of problems. If one choses a single common feature of ours and 
argues that this confers dignity upon humankind, one has first to establish 
how common this feature is in the real world, and then explain why it is 
more significant than others. Why is rationality more appropriate than 
communication skills? Could not one equally argue for just the opposite? If 
one opts for a mixture of common features, one will keep wondering whether 
one’s list can be ever finalized.9 Moreover, one has to determine whether 
this feature (or features) possesses the necessary normative force to justify 
dignity, since we cannot derive values from facts. This is not an easy task, 
since it cannot be denied that most of these traits can be used – and have 
been used – for manipulating, humiliating and degrading our fellowmen. For 
instance, lying requires good communication skills and being instrumentally 
6 Kondylis, “Würde,” section II.
7 Giovanni Pico Della Mirandola, On the Dignity of Man, trans. Charles Glenn Wallis (Cam-
bridge - Indianapolis: Hackett, 1998), 4-5.
8 George Kateb, Human Dignity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011).
9 Cf. the difficulties surrounding the complete description of a person in terms of sufficient 
and necessary conditions as they are exposed in Dennett’s seminal article “Conditions of Per-
sonhood,” in The Identities of Persons, ed. Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, 175-196 (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1976).
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rational is a conditio sine qua non for succeeding in using someone as inferior 
for your own purposes. Not to mention our scientific achievements which 
allow us to turn the whole planet into a lifeless wasteland. 
More promising seems the heuristic which aims to ground dignity on 
our capacity for moral agency, which is here regarded as a value in itself. 
This approach has two advantages. The first is that it avoids the naturalistic 
fallacy. The second is that by putting emphasis on the “capacity for moral 
agency” rather than “moral agency” it does not exclude from the scope of 
dignity minors, who are in the process of developing their moral capacities, 
and those adults whose capacity for doing the right thing has been impaired 
due to a variety of natural or social reasons. We can roughly discern two 
versions of it.
a. The Kantian version
Dignity does not have in Kant’s moral universe the pivotal role of other 
concepts such as the moral law, the good will or the categorical imperative. 
It is briefly discussed in the second chapter of the Groundwork of the 
Metaphysics of Morals in which it is made clear that if x has dignity it cannot 
have a price, and thus it cannot be exchanged with something else. Rational 
beings (including humans) have dignity because of their capacity to legislate 
according to the moral law in a kingdom of ends and commit themselves to 
perform the moral duties this law prescribes. This capacity for universal and 
autonomous moral legislation gives human beings an elevated status and 
renders them superior to other natural creatures. Thus, according to Kant, 
the defining mark of an undignified person is one’s contempt for this sort of 
demanding moral agency characterizing autonomous and rational beings.10 
What is most troublesome with this justification of dignity is that 
it is part of a complex and comprehensive philosophical moral theory and 
it cannot be detached from its main body. It commits us to endorse the 
conception of a kingdom of ends populated by purely rational and abstract 
beings, the notion of the moral law, the idea of an absolutely good will, a 
particular account of how theoretical reason can be practical and other basic 
elements of Kant’s moral discourse. This in turn implies that the justification 
sought can be formulated only within an exclusively Kantian philosophical 
context that is burdened with the well-known problems that concern the 
more theoretical part of the Groundwork.11 Perhaps, someone might offer a 
10 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary G. Gregor (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 4:434-4:440. See also Paul Sourlas, “Human Dig-
nity and the Constitution,” Jurisprudence 7, no. 1 (2016): 30-46, and Thomas E. Hill, “Kantian 
Perspectives on the Rational Basis of Human Dignity,” in The Cambridge Handbook, 215-221.
11 Cf. my Autonomy and Sympathy: A Post-Kantian Moral Image (Lanham, MD: University Press 
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charitable interpretation of Kant’s ethics that can more or less accommodate 
these problems, but still the justification of dignity cannot be given in non-
Kantian terms. In brief, if one seeks to dissociate dignity from inscrutable and 
ongoing exegetical controversies, the Kantian version cannot be her choice. 
b. The non-Kantian version
Here one can invoke as a ground of dignity a wider and less demanding 
and sophisticated conception of moral agency that is not associated with 
a particular comprehensive moral theory.12 Along these lines, moral agency 
may simply mean our ability to contain the pursuit of personal interests for 
the sake of others. Presumably, if people are so much self-absorbed that are 
completely indifferent to the good of others, they cannot show the minimal 
respect required by dignity. Moral agency is a prerequisite for honoring 
dignity. However, if we are to show that dignity is grounded in this type of 
moral agency, we have to establish that the latter necessarily implies the 
recognition of dignity. 
Is this a tenable position? I think not. From the fact that people might 
care for the good of third persons we cannot infer that they regard them as 
their equals in the special sense required by dignity. Let us think of charity 
as it was practiced before the advent of the welfare state. Certain parts of 
the upper class who were aiding those at the bottom of the social ladder 
often entertained feelings of profound contempt for them. They believed 
that the poor were inherently inferior, since they were thought incapable 
of self-control and high feelings, as well as of cultivating the excellences 
of the ruling class. The desire to act for one’s benefit does not necessarily 
imply respect for one’s dignity.13 It is consistent with insulting, humiliating 
and manipulating the object of our moral concern. Thus, special moral 
argumentation should be adduced for the justification of dignity and this 
leads us back to square one. 
Let me explore another route. In the history of western civilization, there 
are many examples of well-entrenched categorical normative dichotomies 
that divide people to superior and inferior based on their natural and/or social 
characteristics. The composition of the groups formed by each dichotomy 
is on certain occasions subject to change, since there might be upward and 
downward mobility, but this does not affect the moral, financial, legal, 
political, and social inequalities that exist between the two groups. From 
of America, 2005), 28-32.
12 Cf. Griffin, Human Rights, 200. 
13 At the same time, we can think of people who are so committed to the wellbeing of others 
and so eager to work for their benefit, that they end up compromising voluntarily or involun-
tarily their own dignity. 
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classical antiquity the moderns have inherited the distinction between men 
and women, freemen and slaves, rich and poor, nobles and commoners, 
civilized and barbarians, the powerful and the powerless; from Christianity 
the distinction between the faithful and the infidels as well as between 
the orthodox and the heretics; from European colonial expansionism the 
distinction between whites and non-whites; from the rise of the nation-state 
the distinction between compatriots and aliens; from the development of 
medicine and its institutionalization the distinction between the healthy and 
the sick and so forth.
However, gradually the propriety of these dichotomies started being 
challenged in theory and in practice. The dismal consequences they usually 
had for those who were cut off from the dominant groups could no longer be 
accepted or tolerated by certain groups or parts of the body politic. There was 
a moral reaction to the injustices perpetuated by these categorical divides, 
which, despite certain occasional failures or extremities, served as a justification 
for a variety of public interventions. This onerous and painful process has 
started taking shape with the two revolutions of the late 18th century and it 
continues until now with remarkable results. Slavery was abolished and the 
term “barbarian” is now used only by historians and in inverted commas. The 
establishment of representative democracy and universal franchise empowered 
common people at the expense of nobility, while religious freedom saved 
“infidels” and “heretics” alike from indescribable hardships. The poor enjoy 
now a better quality of life thanks to the welfare state and the introduction 
of certain redistributive schemes. Men and women are officially regarded as 
politically and legally equal, although we cannot claim that we have won 
the war against sexism. In a similar vein, racism has received many blows, 
but it has not been defeated yet. Supranational political institutions, such 
as the European Union, have done great progress in reconciling European 
nations, although we are far from forging a shared European identity. Finally, 
the reaction against the dominance of medical discourse and its constant 
intervention in people’s lives gave rise to the postwar movement for the 
rights of patients, contributed to the improvement of conditions in mental 
institutions and helped changing our perceptions towards certain forms of 
sexual behavior, which in the past were wrongly classified as diseases.
The abolishment of these distinctions and the eradication of the harms 
they generate where possible, the reduction of the existing gaps and in all 
cases the re-evaluation of the supposed normative categorical differences 
between superior and inferior groups – or to put it bluntly realizing that 
whites are not better than non-whites, men than women, or the English than 
the Irish – continue to be an objective of mainstream contemporary moral 
and political theory, although it is doubtful whether in an era where so many 
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things are said and written by so many people it could be as influential as it 
was in the past. If there is moral progress, it depends heavily on the extent to 
which this objective can be achieved. However, there is no royal road to this 
destination as attitudes do not change easily, people tend to invent novel 
normatively tainted categorical dichotomies and there is no guarantee that 
our moral achievements will last forever. 
Dignity as it has been described can be seen as a moral value, which is 
justified by its role in the struggle against the above categorical dichotomies 
and the harms suffered by those who are not favored by them. It urges us 
to react against these divisions – or not to create new ones – by showing 
the necessary self-respect and by minimally respecting the personality of our 
fellowmen irrespective of who they are or what they have done. In this manner, 
it ascribes people a basic form of moral equality concerning the treatment of 
their personality that functions as a bulwark against the dreadful hierarchical 
and discriminatory relations and the illegitimate exclusions arising from the 
above divides our civilization has abundantly produced. Undoubtedly, the 
pursuit of dignity does not suffice to bring about the desired result, given that 
a whole cluster of values and attitudes should come in to play, but its role is 
distinct and not at all negligible. In addition, this way of understanding the 
value of dignity does not commit us into endorsing a particular comprehensive 
philosophical moral theory.14
6. Shifting now to a more mundane level it is helpful to identify particular 
types of action that could count as violations of dignity as it is understood 
in this essay.15 Providing a complete list would be unfeasible, but if we focus 
on acts that degrade the personality of others either by offending them or by 
using them as mere instruments, it would seem that we are on the right track. 
In the first category we can include rudeness,16 hate speech, racist, sexist and 
xenophobic behavior, various humiliating practices, bullying, hazing, sexual 
harassment, forms of legal punishment that aim at degrading the offender,17 
14 This particular understanding of dignity and its justification is incompatible with the view 
that dignity is the founding principle of all rights. As Rosen correctly points out, the right to 
respect one’s dignity is the only right our conception of dignity could justify. See Michael 
Rosen, Dignity: Its History and Meaning (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), 62.
15 See Killmister, Contours, chapters 3 and 4, and J. M. Bernstein, Torture and Dignity: An Essay 
on Moral Inquiry (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2015); in both works 
there are in depth and nuanced discussions that shed light on how assaults on dignity can be 
carried out.
16 A rude person is someone who does not show respect for the personality of others par 
excellence. 
17 These are rare now, but they have not been eliminated. To give an example from Greece, 
statutory decree no 4000/1958, which was in force until 1983, allowed the public humiliation 
of youngsters who were found guilty of certain forms of provocative and offensive behavior. 
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vulgar satire, the disrespectful treatment of hospital patients, and so forth. 
The second category contains types of action where agents use other people 
as instruments according to their desires and interests.18 In all these cases, they 
assume a position of superiority, which makes them oblivious of their duty to 
regard others as equals regarding the minimal respect for personality owed to 
them. Here we can think of lying, deception and manipulation,19 torture, rape, 
practices of exploitation, modern forms of slavery like human trafficking etc. 
As said before in many of these cases assaults on dignity coexist with causing 
other moral harms of various sorts. However, a caveat is in order here. The 
moral depravity of these affronts on dignity does not render them ipso facto 
legally punishable. Even if we agree that prostitution violates the dignity of 
sex workers, this cannot be the only reason for prohibiting it.
7. As said before, dignity as minimal respect for personality is something that 
is prima facie owed to everyone without any prior restriction or exception. 
However, at which age human beings can be regarded as bearers of dignity? I 
would say from the moment they come into this world and become subject to 
many of the aforementioned categorical dichotomies. We are not allowed to 
humiliate or degrade a newborn baby because of its sex or its color or to use it 
merely as an instrument for our own purposes. It is reasonable to assume that 
the harm resulting from violations of dignity is felt more easily and intensively 
by subjects whose personality has been developed, but this does not affect our 
relevant obligations. Moreover, in certain occasions the harm done may be felt 
with delay, since the subject might have had not understood the violation the 
moment it took place and have had taken cognizance of it much later. 
Does it make any sense to say that we can show disrespect for the “dignity” 
of embryos or in vitro fertilized human eggs? Neither the history of the term, 
nor the justification offered here, nor its everyday use condone the ascription of 
dignity to unborn human beings. To speak of the personality of an embryo in the 
sense that personality is being discussed in this essay would be a category mistake. 
The harms we can impose on unborn human beings are open to discussion and are 
often acrimoniously debated but appeals to their dignity just add to confusion. 
18 The above description retains a high level of generality. A more detailed approach could 
produce a classification of violations of dignity of this type drawing on Margalit’s scheme 
according to which instrumentalization might mean treating people (a) as objects, (b) as ani-
mals, (c) as machines or (d) as subhumans. Avishai Margalit, The Decent Society, trans. Naomi 
Goldblum (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), 89.
19 It should be noted at this point that some cases of manipulation are regarded morally justifi-
able all things considered. A standard example is A’s decision to deceive B in order to save C’s 
life. This does not mean that B’s dignity has not been compromised. It is just that in A’s best 
judgment the moral gains from saving C’s life outweigh the losses resulting from B’s violation 
of dignity. That’s why our obligation to show self-respect, and also to respect the personality 
of third parties is a prima facie obligation. 
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8. Some adults may not be affected by assaults on their dignity either because 
they do not realize what is going on, or because they are used to them. 
For example, in the Stoic tradition agents are urged to acquire sufficient 
control on their emotions so as to counteract the adverse effects of offense. 
Gaius Musonius Rufus, a Stoic philosopher who lived in the 1st century AD, 
argued that allowing yourself to suffer by insults is a token of pettiness, 
while remaining undisturbed in the face of them is a sign of magnanimity.20 
However, the manner people react to violations of their dignity does not 
affect our obligation to honor it. From the fact that they may decide not to 
react for a variety of reasons to these violations it does not follow that they 
waive their expectations of being treated with respect.
9. From the description given it follows that individuals can compromise 
their own dignity. This idea is also incorporated in everyday morality as it 
is attested by the fact that we expect others to behave in a dignified matter 
throughout their whole life. This means among others that we want them to 
show self-respect, be sincere and straightforward, not act in ways that make 
others pity them when they can do otherwise, avoid being obsequious and be 
vigilant about not ridiculing or humiliating themselves. We also realize that 
this is not something easily accomplished especially “in times that try men’s 
souls.” Admittedly, there are differences in the way agents understand self-
inflicted violations of dignity, but the following passage from Kant, although 
it was written a long time ago, expresses some of the relevant intuitions at 
least of those sharing a secular conception of morality. 
Be no man’s lackey. Do not let others tread with impunity on 
your rights. Contract no debt for which you cannot give full 
security. Do not accept favors you could do without, and do not 
be a parasite or a flatterer or (what really differs from these only 
in degree) a beggar. […] Kneeling down or prostrating oneself on 
the ground, even to show your veneration for heavenly objects 
is contrary to the dignity of humanity, as is invoking them in 
actual images; for you then humble yourself, not before an ideal 
presented to you by your own reason, but before an idol of your 
own making.21
How should we react when we see adults compromising their own dignity 
regardless of any other moral harm they might cause to themselves and third 
20 Gaius Musonius Rufus, Lectures and Sayings, trans. Cynthia King (Scotts Valley, CA: Create 
Space, 2011), 50-51.
21 Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary G. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 6: 436-437.
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parties? We should take into consideration that they violate only a duty to 
themselves. This implies that we can warn them about the moral significance 
of their actions (of which they might be unaware) and give counsel, but we are 
not allowed to stop showing the minimal owed respect for their personality. 
These individuals have not breached some kind of contract or a binding 
agreement they made with us. Therefore, we are not free from our obligation 
to treat them in the same way we treat persons who show self-respect. Two 
wrongs do not make a right. Besides, we have to bear in mind that these 
persons might have found themselves in such adverse circumstances that they 
were compelled to sacrifice their dignity for the sake of other overarching 
values.
10. It is commonly held that there is a close connection between the 
protection of human life and the protection of dignity. For instance, one of 
the aims of UNESCO’s Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights 
(2005) is “to promote respect for human dignity […] by ensuring respect for 
the life of human beings,” while Killmister points out that dignity “grounds 
the value of human life.”22 
Claims like these are plausible but they still should be qualified. They fail 
to take into account the possibility of dying to avoid an undignified life or the 
prospect of an undignified life. In extreme circumstances, people may decide 
that death is preferable to a life in which their dignity is (or will be) constantly 
violated and there is no way out of the horns of the dilemma they face. One 
could think of the scores of women who committed suicide to avoid becoming 
spoils of war and in the hands of victors or of many public officials who put an 
end to their life to spare the embarrassment and humiliation of a public trial 
and subsequent imprisonment. We could also think of seriously ill patients 
who do not want to live any more an undignified life with no prospect of 
recovery. Judging the decisions of these people draws heavily on the views 
about the morality of suicide, medically assisted suicide or euthanasia one 
holds, and this is not the place to discuss such controversial issues. My point 
is simply that respecting my dignity does not necessarily imply respecting 
my life, and that respecting my life does not necessarily imply respecting my 
dignity. 
11. Surveying the history of the understanding of the value of dignity from 
Cicero to Kateb, one cannot but observe a common theme that is not missing 
from most accounts: dignity is something that man possesses and animals lack. 
This makes us superior to other natural creatures. Can we accept this claim 
as easily as our predecessors did? It cannot be disputed that our conception 
22 Suzy Killmister, “Dignity: Not Such a Useless Concept,” Journal of Medical Ethics 36, no. 3 
(2010): 164.
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of the normative value of the animal world has been substantially improved. 
Bentham introduced the idea that we have an obligation not to inflict pain 
on them and Kant first pointed out that being cruel to animals is a sign of 
wickedness, but, only recently, certain forms of maltreatment of animals 
became in many countries an offense punishable by law. Some philosophers 
argue that these developments do not suffice, and that we should impose a 
general banning on the killing of animals of any kind. In this changing context, 
the question about the dignity of animals should be posited again. One could 
turn to the biological differences between humans and animals, which reveal 
a completely different picture from the one most philosophers had in the 
past, but any effort to formulate a novel conception of dignity that is not 
confined to homo sapiens will run into considerable difficulties. Our efforts 
to seek one or more indisputably common characteristics to ground such a 
conception of dignity are likely to prove at least as troublesome as our effort 
to ground human dignity in our characteristics.23 Is it possible to construct 
a conception of animal dignity that would be different from human dignity? 
In a deplorable zoo that the Municipality of Thessaloniki still refuses to shut 
down, a wolf was being kept in captivity in a small enclosed space. The poor 
animal kept endlessly moving in circles, which resulted in a ditch as deep as 
to hide the largest part of the wolf’s body. It was a disheartening sight. It 
occurred to me that, irrespective of any other obligations we might have 
to animals, we show proper respect for their dignity if (a) we do not detach 
them from their natural environment and (b) we do not make them behave in 
ways not befitting their nature. This idea in my view could give an edge in the 
efforts to promote animal welfare, and it should be further explored. 
12. Up to now, I have been arguing on the not unanimously held assumption 
that dignity is a moral value.24 The question now is how the moral conception I 
put forward or some other conception affects the law. A cautionary approach 
23 Perhaps, one could try to ground this common conception of dignity on De Waal’s theory 
according to which primates have certain primitive moral emotions, such as sympathy, which 
are encountered in more evolved and complex forms in humans. However, it can be objected 
that the differences between their and our moral emotions are so big (not to mention non-pri-
mates) that they render this endeavor unworthy of the effort. See Frans de Waal, Primates and 
Philosophers: How Morality Evolved (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006).
24 Waldron, for instance, claimed in a well-known work that the notion of dignity makes sense 
only as a legal value. However, the arguments he uses to show the impossibility of a purely 
moral approach, such as the problems surrounding the Kantian conception of dignity or the 
existence of racist moral philosophers in the past, are not strong enough to justify his conclu-
sion. Moreover, he tends to see in many legal rules and provisions a strong concern for the 
protection of dignity, which is not obvious to me. For instance, the maxim that all defendants 
are entitled to legal representation is better justified by law’s concern to protect the freedom 
and the welfare of its subjects and to avoid injustice rather than to honor their dignity. See 
Jeremy Waldron, Dignity, Rank and Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 13-78.
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is here appropriate. Presumably, legislators can incorporate references to 
dignity in official legal texts, a practice that is common after the end of 
War World II. What they cannot incorporate are long philosophical essays 
explaining in detail the manner they understand it. Consequently, dignity 
in legal texts retains its ambiguity and as it has been aptly remarked this 
semantic indeterminacy can pave the way to novel and more comprehensive 
and sophisticated philosophical explorations of the term, but “when dignity 
is elevated from its status as a moral value to that of a judicially enforceable 
legal rule, its ambiguity is less a virtue than a liability.”25 It is not accidental 
that the Supreme Court of Canada in 2008 abandoned the use of dignity as 
a legal test in cases of violations of equality rights as inappropriate for the 
administration of justice.26 Does this mean that dignity should have no place 
in legal systems?
Not necessarily. Ordinary legislators when they decide which forms of 
human behavior should be within the scope of criminal law, they could take 
into account actions that violate human dignity (understood in a strictly 
defined sense) and inquire whether these violations are so serious as to be 
accompanied by legal sanctions. When, for instance, the form of punishment 
for rape is determined, legislators will have to take into consideration that 
rape constitutes among other things a serious assault on woman’s dignity. 
25 Thomas M. J. Bateman, “Human Dignity’s False Start in the Supreme Court of Canada: Equal-
ity Rights and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,” The International Journal of 
Human Rights 16, no. 4 (2012): 577. Let me give an example of a controversial judicial de-
cision involving the protection of dignity. In 2006, the German Federal Constitutional Court 
reached a landmark decision. It stroke down as unconstitutional §14.3 of the Aviation Security 
Act, which authorized the Federal Government to shoot down passenger planes that had been 
hijacked by terrorists with the intention to crash them down causing multiple casualties. The 
Court invoked among others the first article of the German Constitution (Basic Law) that 
safeguards the inalienability of human dignity. According to the Karlsruhe judges this provi-
sion makes it “absolutely unthinkable to legislate the purposeful taking of the life of persons 
who are in such a desperate position,” that is, the passengers of the hijacked plane. Contrary 
to the Court’s ruling, one could argue that in such cases the innocent passengers are doomed 
anyway, since they can do practically nothing to overcome the terrorists and regain control 
of the plane. Taking this into account, which of the following two possible decisions would 
better respect the dignity of those unfortunate passengers? According to the judges we should 
allow them to be used (along with the plane) as tools in the hands of terrorists to bring havoc. 
According to the opposite view, we respect better the passengers’ dignity by sacrificing them 
in order to save the lives of many more unsuspected people and thwart the terrorists’ plans. 
This also allows us to honor them posthumously as martyrs and heroes, something that cannot 
be done if we opt for non-interference. If I had to decide what I would like to happen to me 
– and discounting temporarily any harm I may inadvertently cause to third parties – I would 
prefer the second option because dignity as self-respect includes my current desire that others 
may have a justifiably positive opinion of me after my death. For a synopsis of the court’s de-
cision see https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/EN/2006/
bvg06-011.html.
26 R v Kapp 2008 SCC 41, https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/5696/index.do.
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Thus it would be easier for ordinary judges to apply rules of the type, say, 
“rape which is defined as any type of sexual penetration without the consent 
of the victim is punished as follows” rather than rules of the type “violations 
of dignity are punished as follows.” I am not saying that legislators have 
an easy job to do or that their judgment would be infallible and immune to 
criticism, but in this manner the danger of using dignity in courts as an elastic 
concept which allows for a wide array of meanings is minimized.27 
13. In this essay I set out to take down certain thoughts and ideas that could 
be used to defend a plausible conception of dignity viewed as a distinct moral 
value. In my view, the philosophical endeavors to make sense of dignity should 
avoid its underestimation or overestimation, not render its endorsement 
dependent on the wholesale acceptance of a particular moral theory and take 
into account some of our relevant pre-theoretical intuitions. I do not claim 
that my arguments suffice for constructing a full-blown theory of dignity, the 
final form of which is unknown to me, but I believe they could serve as raw 
materials for starting to work on it. 
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Nicholas Vroussalis and the two anonymous referees for 
valuable criticisms and suggestions.
References
Bateman, Thomas M. J. “Human Dignity’s False Start in the Supreme Court of 
Canada: Equality Rights and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.” 
The International Journal of Human Rights 16, no. 4 (2012): 577-597.
Bernstein, J. M. Torture and Dignity: An Essay on Moral Inquiry. Chicago and 
London: The University of Chicago Press, 2015.
Darwall, Stephen. The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and 
Accountability. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006. 
De Waal, Frans. Primates and Philosophers: How Morality Evolved. Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006. 
27 Admittedly, this suggestion does not apply in cases in which the promotion or protection of 
dignity is prescribed by the constitution [Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (article 
10), German Basic Law (article 1, §1)]. Here judges are free to invoke the relevant constitu-
tional provisions, but the establishment of a common understanding of dignity by courts will 
reduce the risk of arbitrary judicial interpretations of this value. 
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 23/08/2021 04:15:06 |
[ 99 ]
CONATUS • JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY VOLUME 5, ISSUE 1 • 2020
Debes, Remy, ed. Dignity: A History. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.
Dennett, Daniel. “Conditions of Personhood.” In The Identities of Persons, 
edited by Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, 175-196. Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 1976.
Donelly, Jack. Human Rights in Theory and Practice. Ithaca and London: 
Cornell University Press, 2013.
Düvell, Marcus, Jens Braarvig, Roger Brownsword, and Dietmar Mieth, eds. 
The Cambridge Handbook of Human Dignity: Interdisciplinary Perspectives. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014.
Griffin, James. On Human Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
Habermas, Jürgen. “The Concept of Human Dignity and The Realistic Utopia 
of Human Rights.” Metaphilosophy 41, no. 4 (2010): 464-480.
Häyry, Matti. “Another Look at Dignity.” Cambridge Quarterly of Health 
Care Ethics 13, no. 1 (2004): 7-14.
Hill, Thomas E., Jr. “Kantian Perspectives on the Rational Basis of Human 
Dignity.” In The Cambridge Handbook of Human Dignity: Interdisciplinary 
Perspectives, edited by Marcus Düvell, Jens Braarvig, Roger Brownsword, and 
Dietmar Mieth, 215-221. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014. 
Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Translated by 
Mary J. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Kant, Immanuel. The Metaphysics of Morals. Translated by Mary J. Gregor. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
Kateb, George. Human Dignity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2011.
Killmister, Suzy. “Dignity: Not Such a Useless Concept.” Journal of Medical 
Ethics 36, no. 3 (2010): 160-164.
Killmister, Suzy. Contours of Dignity. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020.
Kondylis, Panajotis, and Viktor Pöschl. “Würde.” In Geschichtliche 
Grundbegriffe, Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in 
Deutschland, edited by Otto Brunner, Werner Conze, and Reinhart Koselleck, 
637-677. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1992.
Macklin, Ruth. “Dignity is a Useless Concept.” British Medical Journal 327, 
no. 7429 (2003): 1419-1420.
Margalit, Avishai. The Decent Society. Translated by Naomi Goldblum. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996.
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 23/08/2021 04:15:06 |
[ 100 ]
FILIMON PEONIDIS MAKING SENSE OF DIGNITY: A STARTING POINT
Musonius Rufus, Gaius. Lectures and Sayings. Translated with an introduction 
by Cynthia King. Scotts Valley, CA: Create Space, 2011.
Nussbaum, Martha C. The Cosmopolitan Tradition: A Noble but Flawed Ideal. 
Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2019. 
Peonidis, Filimon. Autonomy and Sympathy: A Post-Kantian Moral Image. 
Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2005. 
Pico Della Mirandola, Giovanni. On the Dignity of Man. Translated by Charles 
Glenn Wallis. Cambridge - Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1998.
Olsaretti, Serena, ed. Desert and Justice. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003.
R. v. Kapp 2 S.C.R. 483, 2008 SCC 41.
Rodriguez, Philippe-André. “Human Dignity as an Essentially Contested Con-
cept.” Cambridge Journal of International Affairs 28, no. 4 (2015): 743-756.
Rosen, Michael. Dignity: Its History and Meaning. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2012.
Sangiovanni, Andrea. Humanity without Dignity: Moral Equality, Respect, and 
Human Rights. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017.
Sourlas, Pavlos. “Human Dignity and the Constitution.” Jurisprudence 7, no. 
1 (2016): 30-46.
Waldron, Jeremy. Dignity, Rank and Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012. 
Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 23/08/2021 04:15:06 |
